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BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT†: THE PLEASURES OF 
FORM IN CRIMINAL LAW 
Martha Grace Duncan* 
Our need for beauty springs from the gloom and pain which we 
experience from our destructive impulses . . . ; our wish is to find in 
art evidence of the triumph of life over death. 
—John Rickman, Selected Contributions to Psycho-Analysis1 
PROLOGUE 
In a noisy Italian restaurant, over low bowls of steaming eggplant 
parmigiana, an old friend startled me one evening by saying, “I just don’t know 
how you can work in that field.”  By “that field,” I realized my friend meant 
criminal law, though I still don’t understand why she condemned it so harshly.  
It’s the goriness, I suppose, all the grisly facts—neighbors attacking each other 
with a hatchet and carving knife in a dispute over a doorstop; a man stabbing 
his wife nineteen times after she taunted him for his passivity; and castaways 
slaying a boy to consume his flesh when adrift on the high seas.  I expect that 
is what she meant by her surprising remark. 
She would not have thought my work unethical, as some people believe it 
is to represent those accused of crimes, for I neither defend nor prosecute 
 
 † Beauty, an elusive and perhaps ineffable concept, has been the subject of numerous attempts at 
definition.  For purposes of this essay, I am adopting the following definition: “That perfection in the sensuous 
order, and, by extension, in the spiritual order, which excites admiration or delight for itself rather than for its 
uses . . . .”  WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 241 (2d ed. 1947). 
The phrase dark of night is a common literary reference to criminality.  See MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, 
ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 123–29 
(1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 255–266. 
 * Ph.D., Columbia University, 1976; J.D., Yale University, 1983; Professor of Law, Emory University 
School of Law.  Earlier versions of this Essay were presented to the Emory Law Faculty Colloquium and the 
Feminist Legal Theory Workshop.  I am grateful to the participants for their suggestions.  For helpful 
comments on previous drafts of this Essay, I also thank Courtney Allan, Thomas Arthur, Robert Atwan, 
Angelika Bammer, Harold Braswell, Morgan Cloud, Dorothy Cornwell, Natalia Duque, Richard Duncan, 
Leslie Fields, Martha Fineman, Marjorie Girth, Nathan Hartman, Allan Hunter, Patricia Horwitz, Kay Levine, 
Betty Moore, Colleen Murphy, Noor Najafi, Ani Satz, Robert Schapiro, Julie Seaman, Charles Shanor, George 
Shepherd, Sara Stadler, Molly Tinsley, Kathy Van Spanckeren, Liza Vertinsky, and Amanda Wilson. 
 1 JOHN RICKMAN, On the Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse, in SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 68, 88 (1957). 
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defendants.  I am a law professor, and my contact with flesh-and-blood 
criminals extends only so far as visiting prisons and interviewing convicts for 
research purposes.  Some of the prisoners I’ve interviewed have become my 
friends; others, my long-term correspondents, through the process of my 
learning and writing about them.  Mostly, though, I work not with criminals 
but with criminal law—a field I adore.  You could say, following Max Weber, 
that I live for as well as off my chosen field.2 
I. “FRAUGHT WITH BACKGROUND”3: CRIMINAL LAW AS A “LANGUAGE 
EVENT”4 
My favorite crime is depraved heart murder.  It boasts the most poetic name 
and the most poetic definition as well.  At common law, this form of homicide 
is defined as murder committed with an “abandoned and malignant heart”5—as 
lovely and evocative a phrase as you will find anywhere.  To be sure, this 
formula sometimes deteriorates into a dead metaphor, losing its rich 
connotations and retaining only a precise meaning stipulated by code.  But now 
and then a judge or jury resuscitates the image, reviving its original, eloquent 
poetry. 
This happened in the 1928 case of Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, where 
the twenty-year-old defendant struck a male pedestrian and the pedestrian’s  
 
 2 See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 84 (H. H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948) (distinguishing between living “for” politics and living “off” politics). 
 3 See ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN LITERATURE 18 
(Willard R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1953) (1946). 
 4 See NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE 60 (1982).  With its focus on 
criminal law as a “language event,” this Essay falls into the “law as literature” sub-genre of the law-and-
literature movement.  Unlike “law in literature,” which explores legal themes in fiction, “law as literature” 
examines legal documents—testimony, jury instructions, judicial opinions, and the like—to analyze their 
literary qualities.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 269–
316 (1988); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW & LITERATURE 5–34 (1992); 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES B. 
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); Guyora Binder, Aesthetic Judgment and Legal Justification, 43 
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 79 (2008).  I am indebted to these and other law-and-literature scholars for their 
inspiration and insights.  My own approach differs from theirs in its exclusive focus on criminal law and in its 
use of literary criticism to contribute to the debate over the respective merits of the Model Penal Code and the 
common law.  See infra text accompanying notes 211–239. 
 5 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 428 (8th ed. 2007); 2 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.4 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2009)); see 
also JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 384 (5th ed. 2004) (referring to “an abandoned and malignant heart” 
as “one of the commonest verbal formulations of the state of mind necessary to establish non-intentional 
murder”).  Another beautiful common law definition of depraved heart murder is “a heart void of social duty 
and fatally bent on mischief.”  Id. (quoting Mays v. People, 806 Ill. 306 (1883)). 
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wife and baby while driving recklessly.6  As a result of the accident, the 
husband and baby died, and a jury convicted the defendant of murder.7  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction, noting that 
the defendant’s compassionate behavior after the collision—specifically, his 
assistance in transporting one of the victims to the hospital—“negative[s] the 
idea of wickedness of disposition or hardness of heart” required for depraved 
heart murder.8 
This opinion is astonishing because, typically, only behavior leading up to 
and including the crime “counts” to establish the crime’s elements.  But here 
the court considered acts occurring after the crime was over—after the mens 
rea (guilty mind) and the actus reus (guilty act) had been established.  In so 
doing, it seems the judges were influenced by the metaphorical language of 
depraved heart, which caused them to assess the defendant’s character instead 
of merely his criminal act.  Upon finding that the defendant lacked the elusive 
quality the metaphor suggests, albeit based on his behavior after the crime, the 
court reversed the conviction of murder.9 
Another poetically-named doctrine is heat of passion, a formula that 
reduces murder to manslaughter when a “killing, though intentional, [is] 
committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood.”10  Just as with 
depraved heart, so too with heat of passion: the words cannot be dismissed as 
mere embellishment—a decorative phrase added to the core meaning for 
literary effect.  Rather, the name heat of passion is central to the meaning 
itself—essence, not accident; a leitmotif rather than a chance image.  The name 
has driven the doctrine, spinning off two other legal metaphors: cooling off and 
rekindling.  The cooling off doctrine states that even when the defendant’s 
 
 6 Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 142 A. 213, 214–15 (Pa. 1928). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 215. 
 9 Id. at 216.  On rare occasions, other judges have likewise resurrected the metaphorical meaning of 
depraved heart.  This is particularly striking in a New York case because New York’s penal code closely 
follows the Model Penal Code.  See People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 618 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J., 
dissenting) (citing defendant’s anguish and despair after the crime as a sign that there was no “evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt of that hardness of heart . . . qualifying as depraved indifference” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  For an example of a court reverting to the metaphorical meaning of “malice 
aforethought,” see State v. Myers, 510 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Neb. 1994) (holding that both intent and “malice” are 
required for second degree murder).  However, this holding was reversed four years later when the court held 
that the word “malice” is basically superfluous.  See State v. Burlison, 583 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Neb. 1998). 
 10 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862). 
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blood has been “kindled by fire,”11 he may not avail himself of the heat of 
passion defense if his blood had time to “cool[]” before he inflicted the fatal 
blow.12  Nonetheless, the cooling-time limitation can sometimes be overcome 
by the theory that a fresh incident occurring right before the homicide 
“rekindled” the prior provocation.13 
A number of jurisdictions have modernized their codes, rejecting the 
ancient phrase heat of passion in favor of the doctrine of Extreme Emotional 
Disturbance (EED).  But several of these states reverted to the old formula 
after a brief experience with the new,14 and a few high courts in states that 
adopted and kept the modern wording found it impossible to abandon the 
traditional metaphor completely.15  In explaining how the new standard 
allowed for more time to elapse before “cooling off” would negate the 
defendant’s “hot blood,” one court said, “[I]t may be that a significant mental 
trauma has affected a defendant’s mind for a substantial period of time, 
simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming to the 
fore.”16 
Like depraved heart and heat of passion, malice aforethought is an ancient 
doctrine of criminal law that evades precise definition.  I treasure the doctrine’s 
mellifluous rhythms, its mysteriousness, and its resonance with times long 
past.  As powerful as it is beautiful, the metaphor of malice aforethought 
determines the difference between intent-to-kill murder and heat-of-passion 
voluntary manslaughter, and between depraved heart murder and criminal 
negligence.  It has been called “‘the grand criterion’” of murder.17  Yet, if you 
 
 11 Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I—Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model 
Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 275 (1986) (quoting the great jurist Sir Edward Coke at 3 EDWARD COKE, 
INSTITUTES 51, 55 (1628)). 
 12 LAFAVE, supra note 5, at § 15.2(d)–(e). 
 13 KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 399–400. 
 14 See Singer, supra note 11, at 293–94 (discussing the mixed experience with the Code’s formulation in 
Ohio, Washington, Maine, and Wisconsin). 
 15 See, e.g., State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1999) (using the words “simmered” and 
“simmering” to describe extreme emotional disturbance); Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1288 (Del. 1978) 
(citing with approval the language “simmering in the unknowing subconscious” to interpret extreme emotional 
disturbance); McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ky. 2006) (employing the term “inflamed” 
to clarify extreme emotional disturbance); People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976) (employing 
the phrase “simmering in the unknowing subconscious” to describe an act that caused extreme emotional 
disturbance); People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (using the words “smouldering” 
and “ignited” to explain that the jury could have found evidence of extreme emotional disturbance). 
 16 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 908 (emphasis added). 
 17 Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *198–99). 
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were to ask what malice aforethought means, you would learn that it has little 
to do with the words that comprise it.18 
Sometimes I warn my students, “The term malice aforethought is a false 
friend, a misleading cognate, like the Spanish word embarasada.”  I pause.  
“What does embarasada appear to mean?” 
A few students call out, “Embarrassed.” 
“What does it mean?” 
Someone yells “Pregnant!,” and the class laughs. 
Other times, I remind my students of Voltaire’s witticism about the Holy 
Roman Empire being “neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.”19  Similarly, I 
explain, malice aforethought requires neither malice nor forethought.  Rather, 
malice aforethought can be satisfied by an unintentional killing with a 
“depraved heart” or by felony murder when an accidental death occurs in 
furtherance of another felony.  
The divergence between the lay and legal meanings of malice aforethought 
has existed for a long time.  As early as 1887, in what has since become a 
classic statement, a distinguished English jurist named James Fitzjames 
Stephen alerted jurors to the risk of misunderstanding: 
The definition of murder is unlawful homicide with malice 
aforethought; and the words malice aforethought are technical.  
You must not, therefore, construe them or suppose that they can 
be construed by ordinary rules of language.  The words have to be 
construed according to a long series of decided cases, which have 
given them meanings different from those which might be 
supposed.20 
That last sentence, with its refreshing candor, always makes me laugh. 
Judge Stephen’s jury instruction highlights a point that students of the law 
often miss, namely, that malice aforethought (like criminal law generally) is a 
 
 18 See Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and 
Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 313 (1999) (characterizing “the meaning of ‘malice aforethought’ 
[as] one of law’s great mysteries”); Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE 
L.J. 537, 537 (1934) (stating that neither “malice” nor “aforethought” has the meaning indicated by “the face 
value of these words”). 
 19 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 417 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968) (quoting 
Voltaire). 
 20 R. v. Serné (1887) 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 312 (Central Crim. Ct). 
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“language event[].”21  In other words, malice aforethought alludes to the 
language of past cases as much as to events in the “real” or external world.  
This implicit referencing of other parts of the canon is what literary critic 
Northrop Frye has called the “centripetal”—as distinct from the 
“centrifugal”—meaning of a verbal structure.22  In the Bible, for example, 
some New Testament stories are meant to be read not merely as parables, nor 
as descriptions of actual events, but also as the fulfillment of Old Testament 
prophecies.23  To read a text oblivious to its centripetal meaning, warns Frye, is 
to read incompetently.24  By the same token, to read the phrase malice 
aforethought oblivious of its embedment in a legal canon is to miss an essential 
part of its meaning. 
Not long ago, I chanced upon a phrase that exquisitely describes malice 
aforethought.  It appears in Erich Auerbach’s classic work, Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature.25  In his opening chapter, 
Auerbach explains that the Homeric poems, despite their linguistic and 
intellectual sophistication, are actually much less sophisticated than the Old 
Testament stories in terms of the characters’ psychological development.26  
“Odysseus on his return,” he writes, “is exactly the same as he was when he 
left Ithaca two decades earlier.”27  In contrast, “what a road, what a fate, lie 
between the Jacob who cheated his father out of his blessing and the old man 
whose favorite son has been torn to pieces by a wild beast!”28  The Old 
Testament patriarchs evolved over time, and when we see them in old age, at 
their most complex, they are, in Auerbach’s wonderful phrase, “fraught with 
background.”29  Like these patriarchs, the term malice aforethought has 
changed through time—not decades, but centuries—and when we study the 
doctrine now, we find that it is laden with accreted meaning and emotion—that 
it too is “fraught with background.” 
 
 21 See FRYE, supra note 4, at 60 (emphasis added). 
 22 Id. at 61. 
 23 Id. at 78–79. 
 24 Id. at 58. 
 25 See AUERBACH, supra note 3. 
 26 See id. at 13. 
 27 Id. at 17. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 12. 
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II. THE MYSTERY OF CHARACTER IN CRIMINAL LAW 
You meet some intriguing characters in Criminal Law.  Consider, for 
instance, the mathematician named Edmund Beauclerc Staples who, one 
autumn in 1967, when his wife was away, decided to become a bank robber.  
In pursuit of his plan, he leased an office above a bank in Hollywood, moved 
some tools onto the premises, and drilled holes in the floor directly above the 
vault.  Feeling tired and afraid after this exertion, he covered the holes with a 
rug and drifted off to sleep.  In the ensuing weeks, apart from returning to the 
office a few times, he took no further steps toward robbing the bank.  In fact, 
he allowed his lease to lapse at the end of the first month, whereupon his 
landlord discovered the holes in the floor and called the police.  Staples was 
later charged with attempted burglary.30 
In a remarkable confession, Mr. Staples described the epiphany that led 
him to abandon his criminal scheme: “The actutal [sic] commencement of my 
plan made me begin to realize that even if I were to succeed a fugitive life of 
living off of stolen money would not give me the enjoyment of the life of a 
mathematician however humble a job I might have.”31  Nevertheless, Staples’s 
belief in his insight wavered.  Even after his realization that the life of a 
criminal was not for him, he went back to the room he had leased and 
contemplated going forward with the robbery.  He confessed to feeling that he 
had made a “certain investment of time, money, effort and a certain 
pschological [sic] commitment to the concept.”32  Ultimately, his better 
judgment prevailed.  As he explained, “My wife came back and my life as a 
bank robber seemed more and more absurd.” 33 
I love the anti-heroic character of Edmund Staples,34 who—seemingly tired 
of a humdrum existence and temporarily without the structure his marriage 
provides—conceives the romantic notion of becoming a criminal, and not just 
any criminal, but a bank robber.  I identify with his yearning to be something 
“great” and with his humorous indecisiveness, so different from the stereotype 
of the lawbreaker.  I also appreciate the way this case fits its locale, 
 
 30 People v. Staples, 85 Cal. Rptr. 589, 590 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 591. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See DAVID SIMMONS, THE ANTI-HERO IN THE AMERICAN NOVEL: FROM JOSEPH HELLER TO KURT 
VONNEGUT 4 (2008) (describing the “incongruity between mundane circumstance and heroic ideal” that the 
anti-hero embodies (quoting Louis D. Rubin Jr., The Great American Joke, in WHAT’S SO FUNNY?  HUMOR IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 107, 113 (Nancy A. Walker ed., 1998))). 
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California—the state where, back in the fifties and sixties, people moved to 
reinvent themselves.35  The bank Mr. Staples planned to rob was even located 
in Hollywood, the city of “make-believe.” 
This case is interesting from a legal point of view as well.  It raises the 
question of whether the culpable mental state, mens rea, must be, as it is 
usually considered, an all-or-nothing concept.  In my own life, certainly, there 
have been occasions when I took quite a few steps toward a goal to which I 
was not fully committed.36  I think of the time when I was in love with Pavel, 
my first serious boyfriend.  A citizen of what was then Czechoslovakia, Pavel 
had come to this country on a student visa to earn his doctorate.  But a year 
into our love affair, his visa expired, and—out of loyalty to his brother, a 
Communist Party official—he returned to his own country.  Soon afterwards, 
he wrote a letter asking me to move there and marry him. 
At first, I acted as though I were willing to go.  I gave up my rented room 
in Manhattan, sold my typewriter and cherished books, and reserved a seat on a 
flight to Prague.  Then I traveled to Washington, D.C., and applied for a visa at 
the Czechoslovakian embassy.  But when it proved impossible to obtain one—
Pavel said his brother had blacklisted me—I balked at taking the final step.  In 
letter after letter, Pavel begged me to fly to Paris and get a visa there, but I 
couldn’t bring myself to go.  By that time, my family had weighed in with fear, 
 
 35 See, e.g., HOWARD KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND 163 (1989) (describing 
migrants as “people in search of self-transformation”); LAURENCE RICKELS, THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA (1991) 
(discussing California as the state of self reinvention); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, Contested Eden, in CONTESTED 
EDEN: CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE GOLD RUSH 1 (Ramón A. Gutiérrez & Richard J. Orsi eds., 1998) (“In the 
Golden State, one generation after another has found a tangible place on which to project its myths and 
fantasies of utopic possibility.”); Moses Rischin, Immigration, Migration, and Minorities in California: A 
Reassessment, 41 PAC. HIST. REV. 71, 75 (1972) (providing statistics for California’s population growth 
between 1950 and 1970). 
 36 The use of personal narrative in scholarly writing has become increasingly popular in recent decades.  
For a good summary of this trend as of the early 1980s, see Fredericka Randall, Why Scholars Become 
Storytellers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1984, § 7 at 1, 31.  For a thoughtful argument supporting the use of personal 
stories in scholarship, see ROBERT J. NASH, LIBERATING SCHOLARLY WRITING: THE POWER OF PERSONAL 
NARRATIVE (2004).  For examples of personal narrative in legal scholarship, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, 
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, HOW DID YOU GET TO BE 
MEXICAN? (1999); JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN (1995); Martha Grace Duncan, 
“So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1469, 1470 (2002); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087–89 (1986); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1710–11 (1993); and Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).  
For general assessments of storytelling in legal writing, see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and 
Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); and 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanne Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 807 (1993). 
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worry, and frantic questions about what would happen to my graduate school 
fellowship if I were to leave the country.  I realized I wasn’t willing to give up 
my studies and freedom in the United States to join Pavel in an uncertain 
future behind the Iron Curtain.  What’s more, I think I knew this all along. 
In the same way, I suspect that Mr. Staples’s mens rea for bank robbery 
was not full-blown; rather, as one distinguished criminal law treatise has 
suggested, he could be viewed as a “Walter Mitty type who fantasized about 
the perfect crime but never really formed an intent to burglarize the bank.”37  
Notwithstanding the ambiguity about his intent and his change of heart about 
the robbery, Staples’s conviction was upheld.38  While this result may seem 
shocking, it has a bona fide explanation in law.  At trial, the court apparently 
refused to believe that Staples had desisted from the crime voluntarily and 
instead concluded that he had been motivated by the threat of detection.39  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of California held that, regardless of motive, 
abandonment is no defense at common law.40  After the crime of attempt has 
been completed, regrets are irrelevant.  They have no more bearing on guilt for 
attempt than they have on guilt for the target offense, once the crime has been 
consummated.41 
III.  DREAMING OF SIMPLER TIMES: ROMANTIC THEMES IN CRIMINAL LAW 
If some cases inspire a fascination through their remarkable defendants, 
others take your breath away with their stately eloquence.  I think immediately 
of Morissette v. United States.42  A David-and-Goliath story, this Michigan 
case involves a scrap-iron collector who, in the autumn of 1948, removed some 
spent bomb casings from Air Force property.  The rusted casings had been 
lying out in the weather for years, and Joe Morissette, thinking they had been 
discarded, took them away and sold them for eighty-four dollars.43 
The Air Force brought charges, urging that it made no difference whether 
Mr. Morissette thought the junk abandoned inasmuch as the relevant statute 
was silent on the culpable mental state.44  In contrast, counsel for the defense 
 
 37 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 11.5(b)(1). 
 38 Staples, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 595. 
 39 Id. at 594. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 342 U.S. 246 (1951). 
 43 Id. at 247–48. 
 44 Id. at 264. 
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argued that “the taking must have been with a felonious intent.”45  The case 
was appealed all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held it necessary 
for the prosecution to show that Morissette had a guilty mind—that he believed 
the property still belonged to someone else—to convict him of theft.46  Based 
on this holding, the Court exonerated Morissette.47 
Morissette’s victory over the Air Force, like David’s over Goliath, evokes a 
certain Oedipal delight.  Yet, to me, the most moving aspect of this case is not 
Morissette’s exculpation but rather the contrast between the petitioner’s low 
status and relatively trivial acts, on the one hand, and the elegant grandeur and 
high significance of the opinion, on the other.  The Supreme Court itself 
highlights this discrepancy in its opening sentence: “This would have remained 
a profoundly insignificant case to all except its immediate parties had it  
not . . . raise[d] questions both fundamental and far-reaching . . . .”48 
The opinion, written by Justice Jackson, contains some of the most 
gorgeously crafted language in all of criminal law.  I especially admire the 
following lines, with their masterful use of antithesis and cadenced rhythms: 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.  It is as 
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom 
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal 
individual to choose between good and evil.49 
Here, in just two sentences, the Court transforms a case concerning a junk 
dealer and an alleged theft of eighty-four dollars into something solemn and 
majestic. 
The sentence that begins the next paragraph is equally melodic: “Crime, as 
a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense 
individualism and took deep and early root in American soil.”50  Here again, 
Justice Jackson expertly employs rhetorical devices—in particular, alliteration 
and synecdoche—to create beauty and persuasive power.  Instead of the usual 
terms of art, mens rea and actus reus, Justice Jackson uses the more concrete 
 
 45 Id. at 249. 
 46 Id. at 247–73. 
 47 Id. at 276. 
 48 Id. at 247. 
 49 Id. at 250. 
 50 Id. at 251. 
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expressions, “an evil-meaning mind” and “an evil-doing hand.”  And, after 
numerous Latinate terms, he achieves the sense of an ending by using 
monosyllabic Anglo-Saxon words in the phrase “deep and early root in 
American soil.”  This final image, drawn from nature, announces a Romantic 
motif that runs throughout the opinion, most strikingly in Justice Jackson’s 
history of mens rea, the requirement of the guilty mind.51 
In that history, Justice Jackson explains that as urban life and industrial 
jobs supplanted an agrarian lifestyle, a new category of crimes evolved to 
protect people in this more interdependent world.  Because of the difficulty in 
proving intent on the part of a corporation president whose company sells 
adulterated food, or a landlord who maintains substandard housing, the new 
crimes dispensed with the traditional mens rea requirement.  As Justice 
Jackson writes: “The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen 
exposed to injury . . . .  Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called 
for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times. . . .  Such 
dangers have engendered increasingly numerous . . . regulations . . . .”52 
Idealizing preindustrial times, Justice Jackson presents them as a simpler 
era when people could not even dream of the highly regulated lives we lead 
today.  He associates this “simpler” era with the doctrine of mens rea that the 
Court wishes to uphold.  Conversely, the opinion links the new criminal 
offenses—those that dispense with the need to show an “evil-meaning 
mind”—with the complexities and dangers of modern life.  While some might 
contend that cities and industries facilitate levels of happiness and fulfillment 
superior to those that were possible in an agrarian era, Justice Jackson evokes 
the Romantic motif of the Golden Age to enhance the appeal of the Court’s 
holding.53 
Having explained how it came about that some offenses lack the mens rea 
requirement, Justice Jackson goes on to argue that the state should be obliged 
to prove intent whenever the crime carries a substantial moral opprobrium, or 
 
 51 For discussions of nature as a Romantic theme, see J.A. CUDDON, A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 
AND LITERARY THEORY 813, 815 (3d. rev. ed. 1991) (defining Romanticism); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1970 (2002) (describing Romanticism as “marked 
esp[ecially] in English literature by . . . an appreciation and often a worship of external nature”). 
 52 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253–54 (emphasis added). 
 53 See generally HANS BIEDERMANN, DICTIONARY OF SYMBOLISM 155 (James Hulbert trans., Penguin 
Books 1994) (1989) (describing golden age as a “symbol” based on “the conviction that in earlier times 
humanity had immediate access to the sources of knowledge” and suggesting that this symbol stems from the 
greater intensity of childhood experience). 
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stigma.  Once again, Justice Jackson uses alliteration to deepen his words’ 
effectiveness: “Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents . . . stir a 
sense of insecurity in the whole community and . . . the infamy is that of a 
felony, which . . . is ‘as bad a word as you can give to man or thing.’”54  
Playfully, Justice Jackson employs the Latinate words infamy and felony, then 
repeats the concept of infamy in plain Anglo-Saxon: “as bad a word as you can 
give to man or thing.” 
In the opinion’s penultimate sentence, the Court returns to the theme of 
stigma.  If the jury had been correctly instructed in the law, Justice Jackson 
writes, it might have “refused to brand Morissette as a thief.”55  And thus we 
come full circle, back to the scrap dealer whose fate was at stake when this 
seminal opinion began. 
IV.  REPETITION AND CONTRAST: THE ELEGANT RHYTHM OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Criminal law can make you feel smart and competent.  And the doctrine 
that is likely to make you feel smartest and most competent is the felony-
murder rule.  This rule allows a person to be convicted of murder without any 
intent to kill, knowledge that death will occur, or even recklessness.  If the 
prosecutor can establish that the death occurred in furtherance of another 
felony (usually a dangerous one), then the malice required for murder can be 
posited rather than proved.  In this way, the felony-murder rule dispenses with 
the centuries-old mens rea requirement and can lead to punishment 
disproportionate to the crime.56 
Although I disapprove of the felony-murder doctrine, I enjoy teaching and 
discussing it.  I like its wrinkles upon wrinkles and exceptions upon 
exceptions, its obscure rules known only to the initiates, the cognoscenti.  So 
esoteric are the doctrines of felony murder that even my fellow law professors 
have usually forgotten them unless they work in criminal law.  When I feel left 
out of their discussions about corporate finance and sports antitrust, I simply 
 
 54 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260 (quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (1899)). 
 55 Id. at 276 (emphasis added). 
 56 For criticisms of the felony-murder rule, see Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder 
Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 478–85 (1985) (arguing that if the 
felony-murder rule eliminates malice, it violates the Eighth Amendment requirement of proportionality); 
James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That Shape Our 
Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1457 (1994) (referring to the felony-murder rule’s 
“infringement of our fundamental philosophy of fault and punishment”). 
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bring up the agency limitation to felony murder57 and the shield exception to 
the agency theory.58  Sometimes, I’ll ask them, “Do you think the merger 
doctrine should limit felony murder when the predicate felony is burglary and 
the ‘felony therein’ is assault with a deadly weapon?”59  They won’t have a 
clue that such a sophisticated issue even exists.  I tell my students, “This is 
great for impressing your friends at cocktail parties!” 
The felony-murder case I like best is People v. Taylor,60 a 1970 California 
case involving a getaway driver, Alvin Taylor, whose accomplices, James 
Daniels and John Smith, attempted to rob a liquor store owned by Mr. and Mrs. 
West.  During the holdup, Smith reportedly “looked intent and apprehensive,” 
while Daniels “chattered insanely . . . telling Mr. West ‘Put the money in the 
bag.  Put the money in the bag. . . .  Don’t move or I’ll blow your head  
off. . . .  Get down on the floor.’”61  While the robbery was in progress, the 
store owners inflicted fatal gunshot wounds on Smith.  Mrs. West shot Daniels 
as well, but he managed to leave the store and survived.  Throughout these 
events, Taylor remained in the car.  Under the felony-murder doctrine, the state 
charged both Taylor and Daniels with murder for the death of Smith at the 
hands of the store owners.62  Although Daniels was tried separately, the jury’s 
decision in his trial would affect Taylor’s fate.63 
What makes Taylor an absorbing case is its aesthetic richness of repetition 
and contrast as the state charges Taylor again and again, always with a 
different legal argument, until the case is finally resolved.  In the first round, 
on appeal from the murder charge, the Supreme Court of California rejects the 
 
 57 For the classic explanation of the agency theory, see Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 
541, 544 (1863): “No person can be held guilty of a homicide unless the act is either actually or constructively 
his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone acting in concert 
with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose.” 
 58 According to the shield exception, the agency theory is “inapplicable to a case where defendants 
forced deceased to occupy a place of danger in order that they might carry out the crime.”  State v. Canola, 374 
A.2d 20, 26 (N.J. 1977). 
 59 To serve as a predicate felony to bootstrap up to murder under the felony-murder rule, a crime must 
have an independent felonious purpose.  See People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969).  There is no 
problem using burglary as the predicate felony where the “felony therein” that the burglar contemplates is a 
property offense.  However, if the “felony therein” is an assault with intent to kill, a California court has held 
that the burglary merges with the murder and thus cannot be used to support a felony-murder conviction.  See 
People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22, 26 (Cal. 1969).  Other courts have held to the contrary.  See, e.g., People v. 
Miller, 661 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (N.Y. 1995). 
 60 Taylor v. Super. Ct., 477 P.2d 131 (Cal. 1970) (en banc). 
 61 Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62 Id. at 132–33. 
 63 See infra text accompanying notes 70–72. 
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felony-murder doctrine based on the agency-theory exception that California 
had previously adopted; neither Taylor nor his agent (accomplice) did the 
shooting.64 
But the prosecutors do not give up easily.  Rather, they then propose 
another legal justification for charging Taylor with murder: a combination of 
depraved-heart doctrine and accomplice liability.  In other words, they argue 
that Taylor could be held vicariously responsible for the “conscious disregard 
for life” shown by his two accomplices in their attempt to rob the store.65  The 
prosecution faces a problem here because, in a previous case involving a silent 
robber, the same court held that mere armed robbery, without additional 
provocation, was not sufficient to establish “wanton disregard for human life” 
such that the robbers would be guilty of murder if someone died.66  The court 
has to overrule the earlier case or somehow distinguish the facts in Taylor. 
It opts for the latter.  The court stresses that the two felons in the store, 
Smith and Daniels, went further than the silent robber in the earlier case by 
doing things that made the robbery exceptionally dangerous.  In particular, the 
court emphasizes Smith’s “nervous apprehension” and Daniels’s “coercive 
conduct toward Mr. West and his repeated threats.”67  Having distinguished 
Taylor from the “silent robber” case, the court finds that Taylor can be charged 
with murder based on the “conscious disregard for human life” shown by his 
two accomplices.68  Following this ruling, Taylor is tried by a jury and 
convicted of both robbery and murder.69  The prosecution wins, and there is no 
reason to think that further developments will be forthcoming. 
Nevertheless, Taylor’s murder conviction is eventually overturned, and for 
an unusual reason.  It so happens that Taylor’s accomplice, Daniels, when tried 
separately for the same murder, was acquitted.70  Based on this inconsistent 
verdict—and the doctrine of collateral estoppel71—Taylor again appeals, and 
this time he wins.  The California Supreme Court reasons that it would 
“compromis[e] . . . the integrity of the judicial system” to allow Taylor’s 
conviction to stand when that conviction was based on the behavior of an 
 
 64 Taylor, 477 P.2d at 133. 
 65 Id. at 134–35. 
 66 Id. at 134; see also id. at 138–39 (Peters, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 134–35 (majority opinion). 
 68 Id. at 135. 
 69 People v. Taylor, 527 P.2d 622, 623 (Cal. 1974) (en banc). 
 70 Id. at 624. 
 71 For a discussion of collateral estoppel as applied to this case, see id. at 625–27. 
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exonerated accomplice.72  When I teach this case in class, I foreshadow this 
reversal of fortune by telling my students that Taylor gets off on the murder 
charge.  Aiming for a cliff-hanger, I don’t tell them why—until next time. 
V. IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO: THE SENSUALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Criminal law is sensual.  It stirs all the senses—touch, smell, taste, sight, 
and sound—but in me it excites the auditory sense most of all.  I like the hard 
“k” sound of words like exculpate and culpable and the definitive, flattening 
sound of the word quashed, the last word in any British case where a 
conviction is overturned.  Though now used to mean “make void” or 
“annulled,” the word quashed derives from a root meaning “shatter.”73  To 
highlight the onomatopoeia, I pronounce it with fanfare, as if I were literally 
shattering the guilty verdict: “Quashed!” 
Another term in criminal law that affords auditory pleasure is in flagrante 
delicto.  Literally, the expression means “in the blaze of the transgression”;74 
however, it is used broadly to mean “[i]n the very act of committing a crime or 
other wrong.”75  In judicial opinions, the phrase typically appears when a man 
has been charged with murder for killing his wife, her lover, or both.  To 
mitigate the crime, the man may claim that he acted in “heat of passion” after 
discovering his wife in flagrante delicto.76  No matter how often we hear the 
expression, my students and I can’t help giggling at the courts’ referring to 
adultery with these quaint Latin words. 
A word you seldom see outside of law these days is wanton.  I smile at its 
unabashed judgmental quality and the sounds of the two syllables that are 
almost, but not quite, identical—a sort of internal “slant” rhyme, as they say in 
 
 72 Id. at 628. 
 73 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note †, at 2035. 
 74 JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 32 (1984). 
 75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (8th ed. 2004) (defining in flagrante delicto). 
 76 See, e.g., Grant v. Dalsheim, 535 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (describing an attorney’s 
“emotional plea on behalf of [the] petitioner based upon finding his wife in flagrante delicto”); State v. Larkin, 
157 S.W. 600, 608 (Mo. 1913) (stating that “even if the deceased had discovered his wife . . . in flagrante 
delicto, . . . he would not go acquit” (emphasis added)); State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tenn. 1987) 
(where a man killed his wife’s paramour after discovering the couple in flagrante delicto, the crime was held 
“a classic case of voluntary manslaughter”); Williams v. State, 165 S.W. 583, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) 
(using the phrase in flagrante delicto only in a West headnote but also holding that where “appellant’s mind 
was so aroused by the act of intercourse he had seen, . . . and he killed his wife . . . he might not be guilty of 
anything higher than manslaughter”). 
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poetics.77  The unexpected stress on the first syllable gives me a chance to joke 
with my students: “It’s pronounced ‘wanton,’” I tell them.  “Not like the 
Chinese soup.”  As to the word’s meaning, my favorite definition is that 
provided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: “The words ‘wanton’ 
and ‘reckless’ are practically synonymous . . . although the word ‘wanton’ may 
contain a suggestion of arrogance or insolence or heartlessness that is lacking 
in the word ‘reckless.’”78 
To me, the mental states of wantonness and recklessness are more 
intriguing than the rather straightforward mens rea of intent and knowledge.  
This may be because I have personally witnessed many reckless and even 
wanton acts committed by a basically good, generous person—my father.  One 
of these acts happened when I was a toddler, during our family’s three-year 
sojourn on a dairy farm in Northeast Pennsylvania.  Winters were terribly cold 
there, and one morning in February, upon discovering the water pipes frozen in 
the barn, my father decided to thaw them with a blowtorch.  Stacks of hay 
lined the inside walls of the barn to keep the cows warm, and my mother 
worried that a spark from the blowtorch might land in the hay, causing a fire.  
But when she expressed her fears, my father became furious at her lack of faith 
in him and proceeded with his plan. 
On the afternoon of that same day, our barn caught on fire and burned to 
the ground.  In the blaze, our cat, horse, and small herd of dairy cows died.  I 
had named those cows, and my father had loved them, but now, with the help 
of a hired man, he had to drag their carcasses to a trench for burial.  That night, 
my mother found my father crying in the attic.  “It was horrible for him,” she 
says, “horrible.”  This is what I think about when teaching the wanton and 
reckless crimes. 
VI.  TAPPING THE BASIC STREAM: ALLUSIONS TO POLITICAL THEORY IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
“Before the beautiful,” writes theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, “no, not 
really before but within the beautiful—the whole person quivers.”79  Criminal 
law can make you quiver with its beautiful language and concepts.  Take for 
 
 77 Also known as an “off rhyme,” a slant rhyme is defined as an “imperfect rhyme, often using assonance 
or consonance only.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1256 (3d ed. 1992). 
 78 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944). 
 79 1 HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, THE GLORY OF THE LORD: A THEOLOGICAL AESTHETICS (SEEING THE 
FORM) 247 (Joseph Fessio S.J. & John Riches eds., Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis trans., 1982) (1969).  
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instance In re Gault,80 a case about a fifteen-year-old boy who allegedly made 
some lewd phone calls to a neighbor, asking her, “Do you give any?,”  “Are 
your cherries ripe today?,” and “Do you have big bombers?”81  Based on this 
incident, along with a few other nuisance phone calls and the alleged theft of a 
baseball glove that never materialized into a formal accusation, the juvenile 
judge found Gault to be a “delinquent child” and committed him to a state 
industrial school until age twenty-one.82 
Following a lengthy appeals process, the case went up on a habeas corpus 
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of Gault.83  In its 
revolutionary opinion, the Court granted certain procedural rights to minors 
who are charged with a crime and threatened with a loss of liberty.  
Specifically, it granted the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.84  
Written by Justice Fortas, the majority opinion runs fifty-nine pages; one 
paragraph, in particular, fills me with awe. 
The paragraph appears in the Court’s discussion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.85  At the beginning of this passage, Justice 
Fortas tips his hat to the conventional explanation of the privilege: “The 
privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the 
safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably 
trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are 
reliable expressions of the truth.”86  He then contrasts this popular view with 
what he sees as a truer understanding: “The roots of the privilege are, however, 
far deeper.  They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle 
because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual’s attornment to the 
state and—in a philosophical sense—insists upon the equality of the individual 
and the state.”87 
One of the most moving passages in all of criminal law, this paragraph 
works subliminally through its numerous Romantic images.  Some of these 
 
 80 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 81 PAUL OMOJO OMAJI, RESPONDING TO YOUTH CRIME 66 (2003) (quoting the boy’s alleged language, 
which is not included in the Supreme Court opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7–8. 
 83 Id. at 59. 
 84 Id. at 33, 41, 55–56. 
 85 Id. at 47. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
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images derive from nature, such as fruits, roots, and stream.  Another comes 
from the feudal past: the lovely word attornment, which means “the act of a 
feudatory, vassal, or tenant by which he consents upon the alienation of an 
estate to receive a new lord or superior and transfers to him his homage and 
service.”88  This euphonious, largely forgotten word enchants me, as does the 
way Justice Fortas revives the metaphor, comparing the relationship between 
serf and lord in the medieval era to the relationship between citizen and state in 
our own time.  Like the pastoral imagery of fruits, roots, and stream, the word 
attornment, too, reflects the Romantic ethos, for it was the Romantics who 
expressed a wistfulness for the past and for the Middle Ages in particular.89 
The exquisite language of the passage quoted above fits its remarkable 
idea: that the individual and the state are, “in a philosophical sense,” equal.90  
Justice Fortas elaborates on this point at the end of the paragraph: “One of 
[the] purposes [of the Fifth Amendment privilege] is to prevent the state, 
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind 
and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to 
decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”91 
These words are, of course, solidly founded on seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century political philosophy, in particular, the social contract 
theory.92  According to this theory, individuals are the primal unit, preceding 
both society and the state.  Originally existing in a “state of nature,”93 their 
lives are “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”;94 to protect themselves 
they enter into a contract, surrendering some freedom in exchange for security.  
And, since the whole point of the contract is self-preservation, they are under 
 
 88 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 141 (3d ed. 1986). 
 89 See ALICE CHANDLER, A DREAM OF ORDER: THE MEDIEVAL IDEAL IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH 
LITERATURE 7 (1970) (describing “medievalism” as “a part of that vast intellectual and emotional response to 
change which we . . . denominate Romanticism”); see also id. at 51 (referring to medievalism’s “Romantic 
origins”); H. W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 453–54 (1969) (describing the “late-eighteenth-century vogue for 
medieval tales of adventure,” “the long-neglected ‘Gothick’ past,” and the Romantic “worship[]” of the 
Middle Ages). 
 90 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Earlier in the opinion, Justice Fortas explicitly uses the term “social compact” when explaining the 
importance of due process.  Id. at 20.  For a discussion of the social contract in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 
see 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 376 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). 
 93 C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to LEVIATHAN 9, 42, 43 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651). 
 94 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 107 (Oskar Piest ed., 1958) (1651). 
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no obligation to obey the state when it no longer protects them.95  Even 
Hobbes, who, after living through the English Civil Wars, had become an 
ardent proponent of authoritarianism, bows to this logic.  In Leviathan, he 
writes, “[I]f the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, 
wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, . . . yet has that 
man the liberty to disobey.”96  As a graduate student in political science, I 
imagined the man “disobeying” by running desperately for his life while an 
army pursued him.  Re-reading Hobbes today, decades later, I am surprised to 
find no such scene in the text, so deeply is it engraved in my own mind. 
VII.  OF JOURNEYS AND LABYRINTHS: THE USES OF ARCHETYPE IN CRIMINAL 
LAW 
At first blush, the crime of attempt may appear a little dull.  And it is true 
that attempt crimes (being, by definition, unconsummated) often lack the 
drama of, say, a premeditated murder or voluntary manslaughter.  In one case, 
a man merely walking along a street and leaning on a stop sign opposite a 
woman’s house was convicted of “attempt to commit an assault with intent to 
rape.”97  In another illustration, Father Daniel Berrigan was convicted of 
attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison “without the knowledge 
and consent” of the warden.98  However, his conviction was overturned on 
appeal because the warden had known of the smuggling all along.99 
While the facts of attempted crimes are often pedestrian, their required 
elements tend to be murky.  The doctrine states that defendants are innocent 
when their behavior constitutes “mere preparation” but guilty when their acts 
take them across an imaginary line into attempt.100  To determine whether the 
defendant has crossed this line, judges and legislators employ a variety of tests.  
Depending on the jurisdiction, defendants may be found guilty if they are in 
“dangerous proximity”101 to the target crime, if they have taken the “last 
 
 95 See GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 435, 494 (4th ed. 1973) (describing the 
conditional character of obedience in Hobbes and Locke). 
 96 HOBBES, supra note 94, at 176. 
 97 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
 98 United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188–89 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See King v. Barker, [1924] 43 N.Z.L.R. 865, 873 (C.A.) (discussing the distinction between “acts of 
attempt and acts of preparation”). 
 101 People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1927) (quoting with approval Justice Holmes’s language 
from Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912), “There must be dangerous proximity to success” 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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step,”102 or one “substantial step,”103 or if they no longer retain a “locus 
poenitentiae,” a place of repentance.104  In a graceful explanation of the locus 
poenitentiae test, a Missouri court writes, “Anywhere between the conception 
of the intent and the overt act toward its commission, there is room for 
repent[a]nce; and the law in its beneficence extends the hand of 
forgiveness.”105 
Because of its elusiveness, the doctrine of attempt tends to be an acquired 
taste, if it becomes a taste at all.  Personally, I have learned to savor attempt, in 
part by thinking about its actus reus in terms of Jungian archetypes.  Implicitly, 
all the tests rely on the archetype of the journey,106 but instead of knights on a 
quest for the Holy Grail, the protagonists here are would-be criminals on a 
quest for property to steal or a victim to rob, rape, or kill.  A particular variant 
of the journey archetype is that of the labyrinth or maze, the image of the 
“wandering path,”107 and this variant, too, appears in the law of attempt—for 
example, in the classic 1927 case of People v. Rizzo.108  Rizzo concerns four 
men who drive around the Bronx all day looking for a man named Rao.109  The 
men plan to rob Rao of a payroll, and two of them carry firearms for this 
purpose.110  However, their erratic behavior attracts the attention of the police, 
who follow and arrest them.  Eventually, all four men are found guilty of 
attempted robbery.111 
Addressing the appeal of Rizzo’s conviction, the New York Court of 
Appeals first compliments the police force for its “excellent work,” and then 
adds, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, “It is a great satisfaction to realize that we have 
such wide-awake guardians of our peace.”112  Almost immediately, however, 
 
 102 Barker, 43 N.Z.L.R. at 873. 
 103 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962). 
 104 Barker, 43 N.Z.L.R. at 875. 
 105 State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317 (1883). 
 106 See NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 118 (1957) (describing the “quest or journey” as one of 
the symbols whose “communicable power . . . is potentially unlimited”). 
 107 See PENELOPE REED DOOB, THE IDEA OF THE LABYRINTH: FROM CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY THROUGH 
THE MIDDLE AGES 98 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also M. L. von Franz, The Process of 
Individuation, in MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS 158, 170 (Carl G. Jung ed., 1964) (describing the “maze of strange 
passages, chambers, and unlocked exits . . . [as] a well-known symbol of the unconscious with its unknown 
possibilities”).  For a detailed discussion of the “labyrinth” as a literary symbol, see MICHAEL FERBER, A 
DICTIONARY OF LITERARY SYMBOLS 102–04 (1999). 
 108 158 N.E. 888, 888 (N.Y. 1927). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id.
 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
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the court begins to reason that there was no attempt because the four men were 
still too far away from the target crime.  Highlighting the absurdity of 
prosecuting these defendants for their bootless venture, the court says, “The 
defendants had not found or seen the man they intended to rob. . . .  The four 
men intended to rob the payroll man, whoever he was.  They were looking for 
him, but they had not seen or discovered him up to the time they were 
arrested.”113  In the end, the appellate court exonerates Rizzo,114 but despite the 
happy outcome, the case leaves me with a bleak feeling.  The four men’s vain 
expedition reminds me of Beckett’s line in Waiting for Godot: “Nothing 
happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it’s awful!”115 
On first acquaintance, attempt comes across as an esoteric offense, less 
familiar than murder, robbery, or burglary.  But, on reflection, we see that this 
crime is all around us, even in the Bible.  One of the most moving biblical 
stories, the testing of Abraham, could be seen as an attempted murder.  As 
recounted in the book of Genesis, God tests Abraham’s faith by ordering him 
to kill his first-born son, Isaac.116  We are told that Abraham had “laid the 
wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the 
wood.”117  He even “took the knife to slay his son”118 before the angel of the 
Lord intervened, saying, “Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any 
thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not 
withheld thy son, thine only son from me.”119  Impressive as Abraham’s 
devotion is by a theological standard, by any legal standard, Abraham went 
beyond “mere preparation” and fulfilled the actus reus of attempted murder.  
And whereas a good defense attorney might argue “abandonment”—a defense 
available in some jurisdictions that have modernized their codes—this 
argument would be unlikely to prevail because the abandonment must be 
voluntary,120 whereas here it was coerced by the angel. 
Psychologically, an even more complex tale of attempt is the story of 
David and King Saul, which appears in The First Book of Samuel.121  At the 
beginning of the narrative, King Saul dearly loves David, the shepherd boy 
 
 113 Id. at 888–89. 
 114 Id. at 890. 
 115 SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT 28 (Samuel Beckett trans., Grove Press 1954). 
 116 Genesis 22:1–:19 (King James). 
 117 Id. at 22:9. 
 118 Id. at 22:10. 
 119 Id. at 22:12. 
 120 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1962). 
 121 1 Samuel 16:1–31:13 (King James). 
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who plays the lyre to soothe Saul’s “evil spirit.”122  In time, however, the King 
becomes jealous and afraid of his protégé.123  Driven by the evil spirit, he 
throws a javelin at David and repeatedly orders his servants to kill him.124  
After each of these attempts, the King renounces his criminal purpose, but the 
evil spirit always comes upon him again.125  In the end, Saul, ashamed, vows to 
let David live,126 but after so many reversals David doubts the permanence of 
the King’s change of heart.127  This story illustrates the risk courts face in 
allowing an abandonment defense—namely, that the defendant who has once 
shown his dangerousness may decide to try again.128 
I myself was once the victim of an attempted crime.  The incident happened 
in two countries, Venezuela and Colombia, soon after my twenty-first birthday.  
At the time, I was living and studying in Bogotá on a research fellowship from 
my college in the United States.  Being required to renew my visa from outside 
the country, I had flown to San Antonio del Táchira, an unbearably hot, dry 
Venezuelan border town overrun with mosquitoes and seemingly devoid of 
culture.  After completing the paperwork for my visa renewal, I saw no reason 
to remain on the barren frontier and wanted to return immediately to Bogotá.  I 
was low on cash, as was usual with me in those days, and I started looking for 
a bus or other inexpensive transportation to the airport in Cúcuta, on the 
Colombian side. 
At a taxi stand, one of the drivers whom I approached for information 
offered me a free ride, and though I should have known better, my need to hold 
onto my dwindling funds overpowered my judgment.  He urged that I sit in 
front with him instead of in back, and I foolishly acquiesced.  The next thing I 
remember is that we were traveling fast on the highway, and he was talking in 
a leering tone about my lips, “Tiene unos labios . . . .”  I turned away and 
grasped the handle of the door, as though about to jump from the moving cab.  
But he, immediately reading my thoughts, grabbed my upper arm and held it in 
a strong grip.  “¡No se bote; no se bote!” he said.  “Don’t throw yourself out!” 
 
 122 Id. at 16:21 to :23. 
 123 Id. at 18:5–11. 
 124 Id. at 18:11, 19:1, 19:10, 19:11. 
 125 See id. at 19:4 to :11, 24:1 to :19, 26:21. 
 126 Id. at 26:21. 
 127 Id. at 27:1. 
 128 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1968) (stipulating that the renunciation is incomplete if “motivated by 
a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to 
another but similar objective or victim”); see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 195 (1978) 
(“[W]here the defense is operative, it is critical that the actor definitively abandon his criminal plan.”). 
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We had been riding for what seemed like fifteen or twenty minutes when 
he exited the highway and turned onto a dirt road.  After driving about 150 feet 
into an orange grove, he stopped the car.  He pulled me toward him with a 
rough gesture and started to kiss me. 
My response was instinctive: I bit him hard on the lips, causing him to 
shriek with surprise and pain.  In that moment, he loosened his grip.  Taking 
advantage of my chance, I opened the door and fled to the main street, where I 
shouted, “¡Auxilio!  ¡Auxilio!  ¡Ayúdame por favor!” until a lady stopped for 
me. 
The lady took me to a cattle ranch where the owners offered me a place to 
stay until my passport and other belongings could be recovered.  Each day, in 
the searing heat, my hosts drove me to the headquarters of DAS, the 
Colombian police, to discuss the progress of the investigation.  On one 
occasion, an officer sat me down at a table to search through mugshots of 
known criminals in the area, but I could find no match for my assailant.  Had 
his photograph been there, I would surely have spotted it, for he had a 
countenance that was striking in its unsightliness—a face as “ugly as sin.”  But 
perhaps ugliness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder,129 and my attacker’s 
supposedly hideous visage was merely my own fear and revulsion projected 
onto him. 
VIII.  LETTERS FROM PRISON: BEAUTY AS MEANS OF TRANSCENDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
As we view the sense of beauty through the psychoanalytic lens, we 
see in it man’s search for perfection, transcendence, and hope. 
George Hagman, Aesthetic Experience130 
From the fifth century, B.C.E., until the eighteenth century, A.D., most 
philosophers regarded beauty as objective—a quality that inhered in the thing 
observed, with ideal proportions that could be studied and known.131  
Beginning in the Romantic era, however, this “Great Theory”132 gradually 
 
 129 For discussions of ugliness from a psychoanalytic perspective, see GEORGE HAGMAN, AESTHETIC 
EXPERIENCE 103–22 (2005); and RICKMAN, supra note 1, at 68–89. 
 130 HAGMAN, supra note 129, at 101. 
 131 See Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, The Great Theory of Beauty and Its Decline, 31 J. AESTHETICS & ART 
CRITICISM 165, 167 (1972). 
 132 See id. 
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yielded to the view that beauty is both objective and subjective—a quality of 
the object, yes, but also of the person observing133 or, as George Hagman has 
written, something “in the space between . . . the potential space . . . ‘the area 
of yearning’ in which we attempt to conjure up the sense of an ideal world and 
an ideal self.”134 
For confirmation of this theory that beauty is partly subjective, the 
expression of a “yearning” for perfection and transcendence, we need search 
no further than the letters of my friend Ed.  Although Ed and I have never met 
in person, or even spoken on the telephone, I feel I know him through the long 
letters he has written me, the photographs he has sent, and the newspaper 
articles and court documents I have read.  Smart, disciplined, and intellectually 
curious, Ed is also a little arrogant and insecure.  I attribute the arrogance to the 
insecurity.  He’s embarrassed—mortified, he would say—about being a 
prisoner.  Incarcerated at age sixteen for shooting two men, one of whom 
remains paralyzed below the waist, Ed has spent just over half his life in 
prison.135  He tells me that he understands all too well what the average person 
thinks of inmates. 
For example, there was the time I stopped writing to Ed after he begged me 
to get him out.  Because I was not admitted to the Bar in his state, and doubted 
my ability to improve his life in any practical way, I had clarified the limits of 
our relationship at the outset.  When he wrote again after my months of 
silence, Ed acknowledged his mistake with self-effacing class: “I’m feeling 
inappropriate . . . .  We agreed when we first started our  
correspondence . . . that you weren’t able to help me . . . .  I hope that the letter 
did not suddenly alter the neat correspondence we’ve been sharing.”136  
Another time, I sent him a Christmas card with my home address on the 
envelope.  In his next letter, Ed wrote that, not knowing the extent of our 
friendship, he assumed I had made a mistake.  Thus, he reported, he had 
destroyed the envelope immediately and made a point of responding to my 
office address.  “I always worry,” he explained, “that I’m going to 
inadvertently overstep a boundry [sic] and you’ll think ‘inmate alert.’”137 
 
 133 See id. at 174. 
 134 HAGMAN, supra note 129, at 97. 
 135 For a detailed discussion of Ed’s crime and behavior after his arrest, see Duncan, supra note 36, at 
1507–12. 
 136 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 5 (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author). 
 137 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 2–3 (Jan. 29, 2008) (on file with author). 
DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:25 AM 
2010] BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT 1227 
Ed is a serious student.  He has read everything that I have published 
during the ten years of our correspondence, including a long scholarly article 
and several personal memoirs, as well as a book I had written before we met.  
Sometimes, he recommends books to me or critiques my work, asking 
pertinent questions and making thoughtful suggestions about commas and 
question marks.138  For example, when he read my law review article “So 
Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the 
Law, an article in which Ed himself is one of the featured defendants, he asked 
why I hadn’t used a question mark after the word Untender, as Shakespeare 
does in the original phrase from King Lear.139  Given the argument I was 
making, he was right; the question mark would have made more sense. 
Several years ago, Ed began studying Shakespeare because he liked the 
quotations from the plays that he noticed in my book.  In one letter, he wrote: 
Well . . . you’ve set me off on an amazing course with the 
Shakespeare . . . .  I am deep into it, and I’ve devised a system of 
study which allows me to break a play completely apart and analyze 
it, in my search for what I’m looking for, which is ultimately Myself.  
I’ve bought into the theory that within Shakespeare’s complete works 
lies the complete range of the human condition, and that we are all 
just shades of various characters . . . .  I believe a mastery of them all 
will equal a mastery of yourself.140 
Reading this letter for the first time, I was amazed by Ed’s resilience in the 
face of his lengthy incarceration.  Notwithstanding years spent in solitary 
confinement, he retains the ability to respond with awe, idealization, and hope. 
Ed’s gift for transcendence shines through again in his letters from a 
“supermax” prison where he and the other inmates were never allowed out of 
doors.  “I fantasize,” he wrote, “about . . . smelling grass or rain clouds, or 
hear[ing] and feel[ing] wind all around me, or smell[ing] leaves, or dirt or tree 
bark.”141  [D]o yourself a favor,” he added.  “[F]eel[] wind all around you.”142 
 
 138 See, e.g., Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 1 (Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with author); Letter from 
Edward A. Tilley to author 1–3 (Aug. 24, 2008) (on file with author). 
 139 See Duncan, supra note 36; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1. 
 140 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 1 (Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with author). 
 141 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 5 (Mar. 12, 2001) (on file with author). 
 142 Id. 
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Some time after this letter was written, the American Civil Liberties Union 
brought a class action lawsuit to challenge conditions in the “supermax,”143 
and Ed, along with some of his fellow prisoners, testified in court.  “We all 
were fascinated by the courtroom,” Ed wrote.  “[Y]ou have to realize that that 
was the first time I had walked on carpet for ten years[,] and that was the first 
chair I had ‘experienced’ in as long (man, that chair was plush; it swiveled, 
rocked, etc. and I had to restrain myself from spinning in it); plus, that was the 
first time I had seen such beautiful colors in as long (rich blues, woods,  
etc.) . . . .”144  Ed’s rhapsodic description of his aesthetic experience resonates 
with the theory put forth by James Joyce in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man.  Speaking through his character Stephen Dedalus, Joyce writes that the 
“esthetic emotion . . . is . . . static.  The mind is arrested and raised above 
desire and loathing.”145 
When the plaintiffs won their suit, prison policy underwent numerous 
changes, among them, the implementation of a right to exercise outside.146  
After his first workout under the new regime, Ed wrote to me with joy: “I got 
to smell fresh asphalt being laid from a construction project within eyesight 
(man, I’d forgotten how awesome that smell is), and I’ve also smelled fresh-
cut grass, and tractor exhaust; I’ve also felt rain and stared at clouds.”147 
Related to his capacity for reverence toward the outdoors is Ed’s ability to 
feel and movingly express appreciation for people.  For instance, he sent me a 
photograph in which his hands are cuffed, but he is smiling.  On the back of 
the photograph, he wrote, “This smile originated all the way back from when 
we met.  You’ve changed my life.”148 
I realize that it takes very little to raise a prisoner’s hopes, so forgotten do 
convicts feel behind the walls.  Still I worry that Ed gives me too much 
credit—that some day he may be disappointed in me, or even feel betrayed.  
Dreading such an occurrence, I try to expose my feet of clay, but he insists his 
point of view is accurate.  Perhaps it is only through idealization that he is able 
to transcend his circumstances, to sustain hope.  For the same reason, I suspect, 
he needs to view nature as astonishingly beautiful, industrial odors as 
 
 143 Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 144 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 4 (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author). 
 145 See JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 240 (1916). 
 146 See Austin, 372 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment claims, related primarily to medical care and 
the provision of outdoor recreation, were settled.”). 
 147 Letter from Edward A. Tilley to author 2 (Aug. 2, 2006) (on file with author). 
 148 Photograph on file with author. 
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awesome, and Shakespeare’s plays as great enough to encompass all 
personalities on earth.149  Idealization is, to be sure, a universal human 
tendency, but in Ed it may also function as an effective defense, warding off 
loneliness and despair.150 
IX.  “FLIGHT IS FOR SANCTUARY”151: THE MOTIF OF THE CASTLE IN CRIMINAL 
LAW 
Hang out our banners on the outward walls; 
The cry is still “They come:” our castle’s strength 
Will laugh a siege to scorn . . . . 
Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Macbeth152 
In Backstage,153 one of his four essays on the writer’s craft, the Soviet 
novelist and critic Yevgeny Zamyatin offers a unique and riveting perspective 
on imagery, one that has guided and sustained my own writing for many years.  
“I rarely use individual, chance images,” he writes.  “[T]hese are only sparks, 
which live for a brief moment, and then are extinguished, forgotten.”154  The 
writer who uses chance images, he contends, has failed “to concentrate, to truly 
see, to believe.”155  In contrast to these ephemeral “sparks,” Zamyatin 
describes “integral” images,156 or “leitmotivs,”157 which emerge from the 
writer’s deep conviction.  Thus, he reports: “If I firmly believe in the image, it 
will inevitably give rise to an entire system of related images, it will spread its 
roots through paragraphs and pages.”158 
 
 149 For a discussion of the relationship between idealization and beauty, see HAGMAN, supra note 129, at 
95–96.  Hagman writes that beauty “results from . . . [a] dialectic between an inner readiness for idealization 
and the encounter with an object that is ‘worthy’ of the projection.”  Id. at 96. 
 150 For a discussion of “idealization” as a normal and universal tendency, see NANCY MCWILLIAMS, 
PSYCHOANALYTIC DIAGNOSIS 105 (1994).  For an interpretation of “idealization” as a defense mechanism, see 
id. at 105–06, 173–74; see also Carlo Strenger, The Classic and the Romantic Vision in Psychoanalysis, 70 
INT’L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 593, 596–600 (1989) (presenting two distinct views of idealization in 
psychoanalysis). 
 151 People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914). 
 152 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 5. 
 153 YEVGENY ZAMYATIN, Backstage, in A SOVIET HERETIC: ESSAYS BY YEVEGNY ZAMYATIN 190 (Mirra 
Ginsburg ed. & trans., 1970). 
 154 Id. at 198. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
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Applying Zamyatin’s dichotomy to criminal law, one finds examples of 
both “chance images” and leitmotifs.  Among the former, I recall with 
fondness Justice Jackson’s term “chameleon-like” to describe the crime of 
conspiracy;159 Judge Posner’s use of the ostrich metaphor to interpret “willful 
blindness;”160 and Judge Tobriner’s reference to a particularly broad argument 
by the state as “an uncharted sea of felony murder”161 on which the court 
“remain[s] unwilling to embark.”  More surprising and significant are the 
images in which judges seem to “firmly believe”—images that have “spread 
their roots”162 not only through paragraphs and pages, but also across oceans 
and continents and through the centuries.  As we have already seen, heat of 
passion would qualify as one such leitmotif,163 and another is surely the castle.  
A storied image, which figures in numerous fairy tales and historical 
romances,164 the castle comes into criminal law by way of the “castle 
doctrine,” an age-old exception to the “rule of retreat” in self-defense law. 
“Self-defense,” courts tell us, with a beautiful maritime metaphor, “sounds 
in necessity”;165 or again, with a spiritual trope: “[N]ecessity [is] the soul  
of . . . self-defense . . . .”166  Derived from Latin roots meaning “not” and “to 
yield,”167 the requirement of necessity flows from the assumption that life is “a 
thing precious and favoured in law”;168 thus, no one may employ deadly force, 
even in self-defense, unless it is exigent, or necessary.  In practice, the 
requirement of necessity means that the defender must believe she faces a 
 
 159 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the crime 
of conspiracy as “chameleon-like” in that it “takes on a special coloration from each of the independent 
offenses on which it may be overlaid”). 
 160 United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that we interpret willful 
blindness by thinking about what “real ostriches do (or at least are popularly supposed to do)”).  For a 
discussion of “willful blindness,” see KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 232. 
 161 People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 361 (Cal. 1966). 
 162 ZAMYATIN, supra note 153, at 198. 
 163 See supra text accompanying notes 10–16. 
 164 See, e.g., SIR WALTER SCOTT, IVANHOE (Barnes & Noble Classics, 2005) (1819); Jacob Grimm & 
Wilhelm Grimm, Snow White, in THE ANNOTATED CLASSIC FAIRY TALES 79–94 (Maria Tatar ed. & trans., 
2002) [hereinafter CLASSIC FAIRY TALES]; Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, Sleeping Beauty, in CLASSIC 
FAIRY TALES, supra at 95–104. Jeanne-Marie Leprince de Beaumont, Beauty and the Beast, in CLASSIC FAIRY 
TALES, supra at 58–78.  
 165 See MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 1067 (4th ed. 2004) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the “slogan that self-defense ‘sounds’ in 
necessity”). 
 166 United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). 
 167 See JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 261–63 (1984) (discussing words derived 
from the root ne); id. at 344 (discussing words derived from the root sed). 
 168 Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (King’s Bench). 
DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:25 AM 
2010] BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT 1231 
threat of death or serious bodily injury; she must also perceive the threat to be 
unlawful and imminent; and, finally, all her beliefs must be reasonable.169  
Absent these conditions, self-defense cannot, in the elegant language of the 
law, avail.170 
Nonetheless, even when all these criteria are met, the defender who knows 
she can retreat from the assailant and do so in complete safety, is in some 
jurisdictions required to retreat.171  Actually, the whole phrase (which derives 
from a time before the existence of firearms) is “retreat to the wall.”172  
Emanating from a strict interpretation of necessity, the rule of retreat was a part 
of self-defense doctrine at common law.  But, when the common law was 
introduced into this country, many jurisdictions, particularly in the South and 
West, rejected the rule of retreat as cowardly,173 supplanting it with the 
amusingly named “true man” doctrine.  As the Supreme Court of Ohio 
explained in 1876: 
The law, out of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human 
nature, will not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or 
even to save life, where the assault is provoked; but a true man, who 
is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by 
violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him 
enormous bodily harm.174 
As a result of concerns about manliness and honor, the duty to retreat is 
now a minority view in the United States, whereas in England it continues to 
be the law of the land.175  Even in England, however, there is an exception; 
namely, the privilege of non-retreat from the home, known as the castle 
doctrine.  As enunciated in 1847 by Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of 
the Court of King’s Bench, the doctrine is as follows: 
[The defender], being in his own house, need not fly as far as he can, 
as in other cases of se defendendo, for he hath the protection of his 
 
 169 See Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1230. 
 170 See, e.g., Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 171 See State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1961) (calling the principle of retreat “salutary if 
reasonably limited”). 
 172 See GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 165, at 1070. 
 173 See Rachel V. Lee, A Further Erosion of the Retreat Rule in North Carolina, 12 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1093, 1095 (1976). 
 174 Erwin v. Ohio, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876). 
 175 See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
237, 243 (2008).  For an excellent discussion of the rule of retreat in historical context, see GARDNER & 
SINGER, supra note 165, at 1069–72. 
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house to excuse him from flying, for that would be to give up the 
possession of his house to his adversary by his flight.176 
More than a century later, an American court reiterated the castle doctrine, 
albeit with tongue-in-cheek: “[O]ur normal solicitude for the life of the 
attacker,” it said, “is somewhat dampened when he chooses such historically 
protected premises on which to make his murderous assault.”177 
Whether the castle doctrine is fully consistent with the requirement of 
necessity is debatable.  On the one hand, the privilege of non-retreat from the 
home seems an exception because the defender could just as easily flee from a 
dwelling as from anywhere else.  On the other hand, some theorists, taking 
literally the old expression “retreat to the wall” argue that the defender who is 
in her dwelling has reached the wall, and thus fulfilled the requirement of 
necessity.178  As we noted earlier in the context of depraved heart,179 here again 
we see how a metaphor that has grown tired and stale can come alive again 
when studied with fresh eyes. 
But suppose the assailant and the defender both live in the dwelling where 
the assault occurs.  In these cases, some courts hold that the castle exception 
does not apply, and the defender must flee.  Making a charming argument for 
this view, the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote in 1981: “We cannot conclude 
that the Connecticut legislature intended to sanction the reenactment of the 
climactic scene from High Noon in the familial kitchens of this state.”180  
Ironically, here the court draws on the very cowboy ethos that underlies the 
“true man” doctrine and uses it as a reason for requiring retreat.  The reference 
to High Noon is especially apt because the movie’s central question is whether 
ex-marshal Will Kane should leave town before the arrival of his nemesis or 
risk a shootout on the streets of Hadleyville.181 
Less hyperbolic, but more poetic, are cases favoring the castle doctrine 
even in circumstances of co-habitation or co-ownership of property.  For 
example, in Jones v. State182 we see the deep roots of the castle doctrine and 
 
 176 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORNAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
486 (W.A. Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds., 1st Am. ed. 1847). 
 177 Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
 178 See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 
4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL. 504, 530 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 179 See supra text accompanying notes 5–9. 
 180 State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 566 (Conn. 1981). 
 181 See HIGH NOON (Stanley Kramer Productions 1952). 
 182 Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8 (1884). 
DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:25 AM 
2010] BEAUTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT 1233 
the feudal ambience it evokes.  In this case concerning joint owners of a bar, a 
man killed his brother-in-law in self-defense.183  The trial court instructed the 
jury that because the attacker shared ownership of the very place where the 
assault occurred, the defender had an obligation to retreat.184  However, on 
appeal from the murder conviction, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that 
the retreat rule did not apply when the defender was in his own dwelling or 
place of business: “Why,” the court asked, “should one retreat from his own 
house . . . ?  Whither shall he flee, and how far, and when may he be permitted 
to return?”185 
By rhetorically asking, “Whither shall he flee?,” the court seems to imply 
that there is no obvious place where the retreating victim could find sanctuary.  
This, of course, is a relatively accurate portrayal of the feudal era from which 
the castle metaphor derives.  In a period distinguished by a weak central 
government incapable of protecting persons or property, the people relied 
instead on local lords who lived in fortified buildings equipped with dungeons 
and drawbridges, turrets and towers, moats and keeps—in short, castles.186 
Beautiful language evoking the medieval period appears again in People v. 
Tomlins, a 1914 case in which a man, acting in self-defense, killed his twenty-
two-year-old son in the cottage where they both lived.187  At trial, the court 
instructed that under these circumstances the father had a duty to retreat if he 
could safely do so, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed.188  In an 
opinion by Judge Cardozo, the court quoted Lord Chief Justice Hale to the 
effect that a man attacked in his own home was not then, and never had been, 
required to retreat.189  Continuing in his own words, Cardozo wrote, “He is 
under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own 
home.”190  Here, Cardozo uses two alliterative pairs: fields and fugitive, 
highways and home, to create a passage of Churchillian beauty.  Then, he 
employs a rhetorical device called a chiasmus, or “crossing”—derived from the 
 
 183 Id. at 9. 
 184 Id. at 16. 
 185 Id. 
 186 For a description of the disorder “approaching anarchy” that characterized medieval Europe, see 
SABINE, supra note 95, at 214. 
 187 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
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Greek for chi or X191—to compose this lovely sentence: “Flight is for sanctuary 
and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home.”192 
In keeping with Zamyatin’s description of the image in which one “truly 
believes,” the leitmotif of the castle has “spread its roots” beyond the image of 
the home as a sanctuary to the implied converse as well: the picture of any 
place outside the home as wild, dangerous, and lacking in succor.  In studying 
self-defense, then, we have the pleasure of contemplating not only our own era, 
but also the era roughly one thousand years ago when our ancestors lived under 
feudalism—that system of vassalage and decentralized power that prepared the 
way for limited monarchy and democracy.193 
X. MISERERE MEI DEUS: THE POETRY RECITAL IN CRIMINAL LAW 
Working in criminal law, one gains a sense of connectedness to people and 
practices of long ago.  In studying homicide, for instance, one learns about a 
monetary fine for murder called the murdrum, which is related to our word 
murder.  According to one widely held theory, the murdrum originated in the 
years following the Norman Conquest, when the English often expressed 
resistance to their conquerors through secret assassinations.194  To deter such 
hidden slayings, William I declared that if a Frenchman were the victim of an 
unlawful homicide and no culprit were brought to justice, one hundred 
Englishmen would be assessed a fine, or murdrum.195  If, on the other hand, an 
Englishman were unlawfully slain, and the slayer not discovered, no such fine 
would be levied on the French.196  This is a beguiling part of legal history 
 
 191 SHERIDAN BAKER, THE COMPLETE STYLIST AND HANDBOOK 462 (3d ed. 1984). 
 192 Tomlins, 107 N.E. at 497. 
 193 In his magnum opus, Barrington Moore argues that “Western feudalism . . . favor[ed] democratic 
possibilities.”  BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND 
PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 415 (1966).  Specifically, he singles out the “notion  
of . . . immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler, along with the conception of the 
right of resistance to unjust authority. . . . [and] the conception of contract as . . . a crucial legacy from 
European medieval society to modern Western conceptions of a free society.”  Id.; see also STANLEY 
ROTHMAN ET AL., EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 24 (1976) (citing the “tradition of reciprocal obligations 
that was feudalism” as the origin of rules limiting the power of the monarchy); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE 
BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 109 (2d ed. 1988) (referring to the role of feudalism in “check[ing] 
royal power” in England). 
 194 E.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 445 (5th ed. 1956).  But 
see Bruce R. O’Brien, From Mordor to Murdrum: The Preconquest Origin and Norman Revival of the Murder 
Fine, 71 SPECULUM 321, 325 (1966) (arguing that the murder fine originated before the Norman Conquest, 
with the Danish King Cnut). 
 195 PLUCKNETT, supra note 194, at 445. 
 196 Id. 
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because it highlights the intimate connection between criminal justice and 
government.  The very fact that the rulers felt compelled to adopt such a 
measure as the murdrum bears witness to the hostility that a conquered people 
harbored toward their foreign invaders.197 
Of course, this story does not explain the contemporary meaning of murder 
as an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.  Historians 
believe that, along with the meaning of murdrum as a fine, it also signified a 
secret killing198 or, specifically, a killing effected by “lying in wait.”199  A 
killing perpetrated in secret was considered more heinous than other 
homicides; thus, it makes sense that the word would eventually apply to the 
most terrible in a hierarchy of unlawful killings.  But exactly how murdrum 
came to be associated with “malice aforethought” remains unknown.200 
Besides the tensions between the Anglo-Saxons and their Norman rulers, 
another force that greatly affected the evolution of criminal law was the desire 
to limit capital punishment.  For about four hundred years after the Norman 
Conquest, all homicides were deemed murder and punishable by death.201  But 
in the late fifteenth century this began to change as manslaughter came into 
being to allow for a kind of homicide that was not a capital offense.202  Based 
on its roots, the Anglo-Saxon word manslaughter should mean the same as its 
French counterpart, homicide, but as J.H. Baker has noted, “the French word 
homicide became the genus, while the Anglo-Saxon words manslaughter and 
murder represented two of its species.”203  When I explain this distinction to 
my students, it seems to help.  For without the historical context, they 
sometimes revert to the layman’s tendency to think of all unlawful killings as 
murder. 
Even before the creation of a category called manslaughter, another legal 
doctrine evolved to “mitigate the extreme rigor of the criminal laws.”204  This 
doctrine, benefit of clergy, did not exclude any types of homicide from the 
 
 197 See O’Brien, supra note 194, at 322 (summarizing the view “accepted by most Anglo-Norman 
historians . . . that . . . Norman lordship was commonly resisted by violent, even ‘terrorist,’ force”). 
 198 E.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 194, at 445; S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON 
LAW 370 (1969). 
 199 PLUCKNETT, supra note 194, at 444. 
 200 See J.M. Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter, 83 L.Q. REV. 365, 366–68 (1967). 
 201 See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 651 (1st ed. 1997). 
 202 See J.H. BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW 227 (2000). 
 203 Id. 
 204 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 75, at 158 (defining benefit of the clergy). 
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death penalty, but instead exempted an occupation, the clergy, from the 
jurisdiction of the civil courts and from capital punishment.205  By and large, 
only members of the clergy were literate, so felons could prove their clerical 
status by reading aloud from the Bible206—usually Psalm 51, verse 1, which 
begins, “Miserere Mei, Deus: ‘Have mercy on me, O God.’”207  Eminently 
suitable in theme, this verse became known by a colorful name: “The Neck-
Verse.”208  Over time, a custom grew whereby shrewd felons, assisted by 
sympathetic jailers, would memorize this passage and, by pretending to read it, 
escape hanging.209  In the lifesaving power of this single verse, we see the 
early entwinement of poetry with criminal law. 
XI.  “A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME”210: THE DISPUTE OVER METAPHOR IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
But should criminal law be entwined with poetry?  Some legal scholars 
answer this question with a vehement “No.”  According to these critics, the 
mellifluous names and definitions of criminal law are “amorphous,”211 
“broad,”212 and virtually meaningless.213  The defining characteristic of 
murder—malice aforethought—is said to be “inscrutable on its face”214 and “a 
term of art, if not a term of deception.”215  The premeditation–deliberation 
formula, which distinguishes first- and second-degree intentional murder, is 
criticized as a “mystifying cloud of words.”216  And the various definitions of 
depraved heart murder are dismissed as “notoriously unhelpful”217—“a 
 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 FRANCIS WATT, THE LAW’S LUMBER ROOM 4 (1895); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
75, at 1031 (defining neck-verse). 
 208 See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 66 (1970) (defining neck-verse). 
 209 CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE ROOTS OF EVIL: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 16 
(1963). 
 210 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, ll. 43–44. 
 211 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (And Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1, 43 (2000). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Cf. MARCUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: THE MODEL PENAL CODE 2 (2002) (describing the author’s 
first encounter with the Model Penal Code, when he found that “[s]uddenly words mattered; words even 
retained their meaning from one rule to the next”). 
 214 Robinson, supra note 211, at 43. 
 215 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1978). 
 216 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR LAW 27 (1930). 
 217 Mounts, supra note 18, at 362. 
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collection of colorful verbiage”218 that “tend[s] to carry more flavor than 
meaning.”219 
Disdaining criminal law’s figurative language, with its inevitable 
ambiguity, legal scholars have urged replacing the traditional terms with words 
that have precise and consistent meanings.220  Like Juliet Capulet, who urged 
Romeo to “be some other name”221 because Montague is “nor hand nor 
foot/Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part/Belonging to a man,”222 these 
scholars assume that names are mere “arbitrary symbol[s]”223 and can thus be 
altered with impunity.  In a concrete manifestation of this assumption, the 
American Law Institute sponsored the creation of the Model Penal Code 
(MPC), which has been adopted in substantial part by more than half the 
states.224  The explicit purpose of the MPC is to “dispel the obscurity” of the 
common law.225 
In contrast to its critics, I believe that the common law language of criminal 
law is valuable for its beauty, its rich historical resonance, and its expressive 
meaning.  Rather than being a failed attempt at precise language, the common 
law terminology is, I propose, a different kind of language altogether.  It is 
what philosopher Philip Wheelwright calls “expressive” or “depth 
language,”226 where ambiguity stems not from sloppiness but from an effort to 
unite diverse associations and thereby invent new meanings.227 
 
 218 KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 362 (2005). 
 219 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 441 (7th ed. 2001). 
 220 See, e.g., Bernard E. Gegan, A Case of Depraved Mind Murder, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 417, 459 (1974) 
(describing the ambiguity of depraved heart murder and suggesting that “we would be better off without it”); 
Robinson, supra note 211, at 10 (arguing that a criminal code should be drafted in “common and plain words 
where possible and provide straightforward definitions” using “short and clear” sentences). 
 221 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1. 
 222 Id. 
 223 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. at 14 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980) (quoting the 1953 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224 KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 133. 
 225 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
 226 PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, THE BURNING FOUNTAIN: A STUDY IN THE LANGUAGE OF SYMBOLISM 15 (rev. 
ed. 1968) (emphasis added). 
 227 Id. at 81 (describing “[p]oetically charged language” as always “produc[ing] an integral meaning that 
radically transcends the sum of the ingredient meanings”); see also OWEN BARFIELD, Poetic Diction and Legal 
Fiction, in THE REDISCOVERY OF MEANING, AND OTHER ESSAYS 44, 60 (1977) (emphasizing the importance of 
metaphor in making meaning and explaining why “the logical use of language can never add any meaning to 
it”). 
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In his seminal books Metaphor and Reality228 and The Burning 
Fountain,229 Wheelwright distinguishes between “expressive” language, on the 
one hand, and what he calls “steno” language, on the other.230  Steno-language 
refers to utterances that have a “fixed set of associations,” the same in every 
context.231  This rigidity of meaning may come about in two ways: from 
prescription, as in science (and the MPC), or from inertia, as in metaphors that 
have lost their freshness from overuse (for instance, “a tragic death”).232  In its 
prescribed form, steno-language eschews vagueness and ambiguity and “can 
be shared in exactly the same way by a very large number of persons.”233  This 
“public exactitude,”234 rather than evocativeness or nuance, is the virtue of 
steno-language. 
In expressive language, on the other hand, the meanings of words are not 
fixed but may vary with the context.  Expressive language is “self-
transcendent,”235 evoking associations that generate tension, even paradox, by 
their juxtaposition.  For instance, in the phrase depraved heart, a word 
associated with evil is juxtaposed to one associated with goodness, resulting in 
a term that is vibrant with contradiction.  In expressive utterances, as in poetry, 
the choice of language is never accidental; rather, there is an organic and 
interactive relationship between the words and the thought.236  While lacking 
the clarity and precision of steno-language, expressive language has its own 
virtue: fullness of expression.237 
Framing the issue still more broadly, I believe that the figurative language 
of criminal law reflects the ethos of the Romantic Movement,238 whereas the 
 
 228 PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, METAPHOR AND REALITY (1962). 
 229 WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 226. 
 230 Id. at 17. 
 231 Id. at 50. 
 232 See WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 228, at 37, 94. 
 233 Id. at 33. 
 234 Id. at 94. 
 235 WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 226, at 7. 
 236 Id. at 76.  Illustrating this point, Wheelwright says that “if Shakespeare had decided to let the Weird 
Sisters inhabit water . . . instead of ‘fog and filthie air,’ the whole play of Macbeth would have been 
profoundly different.”  Id. (quoting WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 228, at 95). 
 237 Id. at 15.  Cf. C.S. Lewis, Bluspels and Flalanspheres, in THE NORTON READER 136, 148 (Arthur M. 
Eastman ed., rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that “meaning . . . is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood” 
and that imaginative language is richer in meaning than literal language). 
 238 The resonance between criminal law and Romanticism has been largely overlooked by previous 
scholars.  For example, the 760-page book Romanticism: An Oxford Guide contains numerous chapters 
demonstrating the themes of Romanticism in fields such as ecology, feminism, post-colonialism, science, 
politics, and psychoanalysis, but makes no mention of criminal law.  See ROMANTICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE 
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opposition to this language reflects the ethos of the Enlightenment.  In The 
Passion of the Western Mind, historian and philosopher Richard Tarnas 
describes the Romantic vision of reality that arose in Europe in the late 
eighteenth century and how it departed from that of the Classical school: “For 
the Romantic, reality was symbolically resonant through and through, and was 
therefore fundamentally multivalent, a constantly changing complex of many-
leveled meanings, even of opposites.  For the Enlightenment-scientific mind, 
by contrast, reality was concrete and literal, univocal.”239  When we understand 
the disagreement over the language of criminal law as a particular instance of a 
vast historical and philosophical debate, we realize that both kinds of language 
are necessary; they are dialectically related Weltanschauungs and form parts of 
a single whole. 
XII.  “HALF-VEILED AND HALF-REVEALED”: THE DUSKY IMAGES AND 
SHROUDED TRUTHS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
The artist leaves his “deep and hidden truth” half-veiled and half-
revealed. 
Robert Donington240 
Amidst the rich, figurative language of criminal law, this Essay has 
considered imagery that clusters around several subjects: the body (depraved 
heart, hot blood, the hand of forgiveness); fire (heat of passion, simmering, 
cooling-off, rekindling); the journey (dangerous proximity, last step, place of 
repentance); and the feudal past (attornment, castle, retreat to the wall).  But 
we have yet to discuss another important leitmotif, that of the earth’s turning 
or, more exactly, the shadows and darkness that descend upon the earth when it 
faces away from the sun or is blocked from the sun’s rays.  To be sure, some of 
these images fall into the class that Zamyatin calls “individual, chance  
images . . . which live for a brief moment, and then are extinguished, 
forgotten.”241 
 
(Nicholas Roe ed., 2005).  And yet, to echo what Andrew Michael Roberts writes about psychoanalysis, 
criminal law and Romanticism “seem made for each other.”  Andrew Michael Roberts, Psychoanalysis, in 
ROMANTICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE, supra at 219, 219.  In addition to the central role of figurative language, 
another characteristic that criminal law shares with Romanticism is the “foregrounding of individual 
consciousness.”  See Paul D. Sheats, Lyric, in ROMANTICISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE, supra at 310, 319.  In 
criminal law, the central importance of individual subjectivity is reflected in the concept of mens rea.  See, 
e.g., supra text accompanying notes 42–55. 
 239 RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 368 (1991). 
 240 ROBERT DONINGTON, WAGNER’S ‘RING’ AND ITS SYMBOLS 13, 15 (3d ed. 1984). 
 241 ZAMYATIN, supra note 153, at 198. 
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Such is the image of “shadows” in the phrase “mere names and shadows,” 
which a court used to belittle the refined subtleties of embezzlement law in one 
nineteenth-century case.242  In that case, the defendant argued that a quantity of 
wheat stored in a warehouse was not “under his care”;243 thus, the crime of 
embezzlement (which requires that the “appropriated” property be in the 
lawful possession of the embezzler) was not established.244  Upholding the 
conviction, the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that courts should not be 
“misled by mere names and shadows.”245 
As in the embezzlement case, the court in United States v. Lyons246 
employs images of visible darkness—twilight and dusk—to convey the concept 
of insignificance.  Specifically, the Lyons court alludes to the hazy distinction 
between these two stages of nightfall to disparage the “irresistible impulse” 
prong of the insanity defense.  Poetically, it writes, “The line between an 
irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than 
between twilight and dusk.”247 
Yet another chance expression of the darkness archetype appears in the 
court’s explanation of character evidence in Michelson v. United States.248  
Here, the court states that witnesses may not testify about their personal 
experience with the defendant—only as to the defendant’s reputation, that is, 
“as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood.”249  Reminiscent 
of Plato’s allegory of the cave where the prisoners see only shadows projected 
onto the wall by the fire behind them,250 this use of the metaphor emphasizes 
the difference between mediated perceptions and “direct” experience. 
Among chance images that relate to the earth’s circadian rhythm, a 
particularly striking illustration appears in Justice Burger’s opinion in the 1975 
case of Breed v. Jones.251  The case concerns the privilege against double 
jeopardy—more specifically, whether it should apply to minors who are 
 
 242 Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 366 (1868). 
 243 Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 247 Id. at 248 (quoting American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 J. AM. 
PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 248 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478–86 (1948). 
 249 Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
 250 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 193–94 (Allan Bloom trans. & ed., Basic Books 2d ed. 1968) (c. 
360 B.C.E). 
 251 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
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adjudicated first in juvenile court and then, after transfer, in criminal court.252  
Three paragraphs into the analytic part of the opinion, Justice Burger sums up 
the Court’s reasoning in these words: “We believe it is simply too late in the 
day to conclude . . . that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose 
object is to determine whether he has . . . violate[d] a criminal law and whose 
potential consequences include . . . stigma . . . and the deprivation of liberty for 
many years.”253 
I have always admired this sentence, but never fully understood why.  Now 
I see that in the five short words comprising the phrase “too late in the day,” 
Justice Burger has accomplished something remarkable.  He has not only 
alluded to the great juvenile justice cases of the 1960s and early 70s;254 not 
only suggested that the holding in Breed could not, logically, be other than it 
is; but also, with that brief image, he managed to recall the seventy-five year 
history of a grand social experiment: the ardent enthusiasm of those who 
espoused the virtues of the juvenile court at the end of the last century, who 
clung to hope in the face of growing disappointment, and who, by 1975, 
experienced regret and a sense of defeat.255 
In addition to its role as a “chance” image in numerous criminal cases, 
darkness has been a dominant image in the crime of burglary.  As early as the 
1450s, perhaps earlier, it was settled that burglary included a nocturnal 
element256—a requirement that naturally raised the question of how night 
should be defined.  The answer, in the beginning, was that night meant any 
time between sunset and sunrise.257  From the criminal perspective, this 
interpretation was harsh for it allowed a conviction for burglary even when the 
offense occurred under conditions of partial visibility, when a glow emanated 
 
 252 Id. at 519. 
 253 Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 254 See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that when a juvenile is charged with a 
criminal offense, every element of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles accused of crimes in juvenile proceedings must be accorded the same due 
process rights as adults); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that the juvenile court’s latitude 
in determining whether to waive jurisdiction and allow a case to be heard in criminal court is not total). 
 255 For a brief summary of the history of the juvenile justice system, see Breed, 421 U.S. at 528–29 
(acknowledging the “gap between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities”).  For more 
detailed discussions, see Introduction to Part II: The Origin of the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 
PHILOSOPHY 27, 27–36 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 2d ed. 1979); Anthony Platt, The Rise 
of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and Correctional Reform, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 
PHILOSOPHY, supra at 115, 115–138. 
 256 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 532 (4th ed. 2002). 
 257 Id. 
DUNCAN GALLEYSFINAL 9/10/2010  10:25 AM 
1242 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
from below the horizon, at dawning or at twilight.  More benevolent in its 
impact on criminals was an interpretation adopted later—that of night as the 
time “when a man’s face could not be discerned.”258  This approach would 
have benefitted the offender who, when unlawfully “breaking and entering a 
dwelling of another at night with intent to commit some felony inside,”259 
made sure to do so between daybreak and sunrise, or between sunset and total 
darkness. 
In contemporary times, some American jurisdictions have obliterated the 
“at night” element of burglary, but regardless of the statutory definition, 
darkness still carries rhetorical power.  In fact, Judge Leventhal’s dissent in 
United States v. Barker, one of the cases emerging out of the Watergate 
scandal of the 1970s—one of the most beautiful dissents in all of criminal 
law—uses nighttime both literally and symbolically to great effect.260  Barker 
concerns two men who broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist 
in hopes of discrediting the man (Ellsberg) who had released the Pentagon 
Papers to the press.261  The two men assumed that their supervisor, who wrote 
to Barker on White House stationary, could legally authorize the forcible 
break-in as a patriotic act in the interest of national security.262  In this 
assumption they were, of course, mistaken.  The question the court faces on 
appeal is whether their mistake should exonerate them.263 
Although time of day is not an issue in this case, Judge Leventhal 
emphasizes when the crime was committed, using expressions such as 
“compounded by subterfuge [and] dark of night.”264  Toward the end of the 
opinion, Leventhal again alludes to night, this time substituting the more 
ominous word “dead” for “dark,” thus conjuring up thoughts of homicide.265  
Using the intimate first-person point of view and slowing down the sentence 
through repetition, dashes, and monosyllabic words, Judge Leventhal offers the 
reader this moving statement of personal belief: “I come back—again and 
again in my mind—to the stark fact that we are dealing with a breaking and 
 
 258 Id. at 533. 
 259 KADISH ET AL., supra note 5, at 561. 
 260 546 F.2d 940, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  For background on the Watergate scandal, see JOHN W. DEAN, 
BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1976); and JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE BATTLES 
OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS COX AND JAWORSKI (1977). 
 261 Barker, 546 F.2d at 943. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. at 944. 
 264 Id. at 958. 
 265 Id. at 973. 
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entering in the dead of night, both surreptitious and forcible, and a violation of 
civil rights statutes.”266  The next sentence is the last substantive sentence in 
the opinion, and in this prominent place the judge presents a variation on his 
theme: “This,” he writes, “is simply light years away from the kinds of 
situations where the law has gingerly carved out exceptions permitting 
reasonable mistake of law as a defense.”267  Ironically, the phrase “light years” 
evokes, for many of us, the seemingly infinite darkness of a journey through 
space, the kind of pilgrimage that light must make to reach us from a star. 
As in particular cases, judges employ the images of nighttime, dusk, 
shadow, and twilight to clarify their reasoning or render a holding more 
eloquent, so also in criminal law generally, scholars use metaphors of obscurity 
to describe the enigmatic nature of the field.268  As we have seen, these 
metaphors are often intended as criticisms, yet the nebulousness of the 
doctrines may be the very quality that gives criminal law its beauty.  Like the 
artist, criminal law “leaves [its] ‘deep and hidden truth’ half-veiled and half-
revealed.”269  And the veil that criminal law drapes over its “truth” is 
composed of language—the beautiful language of poetry. 
EPILOGUE 
Some say a marshaling of horsemen, others, soldiers on the march, 
And others still say that a fleet of ships is the most beautiful thing 
on the dark earth.  I say 
it is what you love. 
Sappho, Fragment 16270 
One evening, not long ago, I had dinner again with the friend who had 
wondered how I could work in “that field.”  We met in the same Italian 
restaurant as before, though it seemed like a different place because of 
attractive renovations.  The walls, which had previously shone bright yellow, 
were now a stylish pumpkin; the blinding overhead lighting had been replaced 
by the soft glow of Tiffany pendant lamps, and the tables, which had been 
crowded together, were separated now, resulting in a more peaceful ambience.  
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In addition to the altered decor, the restaurant boasted a new menu, so my 
friend and I departed from our traditional eggplant parmigiana and ordered the 
apple- and goat-cheese ravioli and lasagna. 
In the months since our previous dinner, I had reflected on my friend’s 
remark.  Her implicit question had startled me then, leaving me unable to 
articulate a response.  Now better prepared, I explained that criminal law 
succeeded to the passion I once bestowed on my first intellectual love—
political science.  According to Max Weber’s classic description, the state “has 
been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force 
as a means of domination within a territory.”271  Punishment, a “legitimate use 
of physical force,” is thus a quintessential function of the state.  And, because 
of the risk it poses to life and liberty, criminal law represents the juncture 
where state and individual interact in the most dramatic way; the point at 
which the state goes furthest in exerting its authority over the citizen. 
But whereas, in the beginning, my attraction to criminal law centered on 
what one might call its “hard” aspect—its inextricable link to authority and 
violence—over time, my fascination with the field came to derive from its 
“soft” qualities as well—from the rich poetry of its images, the melody of its 
cadences, and the aesthetically pleasing contrast between its facts, which are 
ever new, and its doctrines, which are centuries old. 
Almost everything looks different when seen from up close than it does 
from afar, and criminal law is no exception.  It has taken years for me to move 
near enough to see criminal law as a language event, with centripetal as well as 
centrifugal meanings; to appreciate that criminal law is “fraught with 
background”; to notice the awesome beauty of its doctrines, yet still 
sympathize with those who (like my friend) repudiate the field as gory and 
macabre.  In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud suggests that intellectually 
engrossing work, if one is lucky enough to find it, may be the most reliable of 
all sources of happiness.272  I am grateful to have discovered, in criminal law, 
work that can stand up to this challenge and, with it, the opportunity to live for 
as well as off my vocation.273 
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